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Abstract 
Using a spatial model, we compare different rules for aggregating preferences 
across confederated districts, under the assumption that voters have private 
information and face uncertainty about the distribution of preferences of other 
voters. 
Our model includes, as special cases, systems of local representation in 
national assemblies and parliaments and international legislatures with rep­
resentatives from member states. We show how induced preferences over the 
degree of centralization and the method of representation (proportional vs. 
equal representation of districts) vary systematically across voters and dis­
tricts, depending on such factors as relative size of the districts, the number 
of districts, and the variance of underlying policy preferences. 
We show that each voter has an ideal confederation in which representation 
consists solely of equal representation. These ideal confederations vary across 
voters, but are independent district size. Moderate voters prefer a higher 
degree of centralization than extreme voters. Preference for centralization is 
increasing in the number of districts and decreasing in the variance of voter 
ideal points. 
With two districts, majority rule equilibria always exists and can have 
some degree of proportional representation. With three or more districts, 
majority rule equilibrium often fails to exist. Nonexistence arises due to 
cycling in the two dimensional-Centralization x Representation-space of 
confederations. 
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1 Introduction 
Episodes of political confederation, or the opposite movement of political dissolution, 
are widely observed and important historical phenomena, yet the forces underlying the 
actual process of confederation are not well-understood. There are many different levels 
of political units, ranging from towns and villages to states or provinces, to nation-states, 
and even beyond, to supranational bodies such as the United Nations and the European 
Union. Generally rules exist that govern the interaction between units of different levels, 
and the allocation of decision-making authority among them. It is the determination of 
such rules and the development of a theoretical foundation for studying these rules that 
we address in this paper. We call this the problem of political confederation. 
The problem of political confederation is one of the most fundamental of all problems 
in political science. It arises in many contexts, both large and small. Several examples 
come immediately to mind: 
• The ceding of sovereignty to international organizations by member-nations. 
• The issue of "states rights" in American politics. 
• The nature of representation of provinces in national assemblies. 
• The allocation of taxing authority in a federal system. 
• The adoption of uniform standards across jurisdictions (pollution, education, roads, 
etc.). 
• The formation of Nation-States 
• Constitutional Amendments 
A number of specific examples have been studied in great detail by scholars of history 
and political science, particularly with regard to the evolution and collapse of interna­
tional organizations and the drafting of constitutions. Most of this work attempts to 
identify in descriptive terms the important forces that were operative in those isolated 
incidents, and this has provided some useful insights into the problem. We are attempt­
ing here to capture some of the general features of the problem in a formal model, and 
to derive some theoretical implications. 
To this end, we simply model a confederation as a collection of districts, together with 
rules for the aggregation of preferences of the members of the various districts, which 
produces a policy outcome that can vary across districts. The districts can be thought 
of as regions, provinces, counties, villages, or other well-defined decentralized political 
units. The larger body is referred to as the "Confederation," and it can be thought of as 
any political unit that contains some collection of smaller political units. 
In terms more familiar to economists that political scientists, it is a mechanism design 
problem, which is a meta-decisionmaking problem in which the decision to be taken is a 
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set of rules for making decisions. It can also be thought of as the problem of constitu­
tional design. What makes the problem of constitutional design especially complicated 
is that the constitutional designers themselves have preferences1 over the outcomes and 
policies that will ultimately be decided according to the rules for preference aggregation 
that are chosen at the constitution-making stage. Thus, the designers will have induced 
preferences over the rules, that depend upon their preferences over policy outcomes and 
the specific features of their own district. 
The model we use is very simple. It combines the standard spatial model of political 
competition, with the presence of asymmetric information and multiple districts. It builds 
on the model of Cremer and Palfrey (1996), in which voters from a district know only their 
own ideal point in a policy space and some common information about the distribution 
of preferences in their district and in other districts. With incomplete information, the 
policy outcomes that emerge from different rules of confederation are uncertain prospects, 
so the induced preferences over a space of rules reflects not only a voter's ideal point, 
but also a voter's attitudes about risky outcomes. In the standard Downsian model, 
preferences necessarily exhibit some degree of concavity over outcomes, which produces 
risk aversion if the policy outcomes are uncertain. 
Our earlier paper considered just two polar extremes of confederation. At one ex­
treme, (the null confederation) there would be no national government at all, and the 
policy outcomes of different jurisdictions would be determined independently, simply as 
the median preference of the district (which, it must be remembered, is a random vari­
able in our model) . At the polar extreme, the districts cede all sovereignty to a central 
confederational government, so that all districts have the same policy, which is decided 
by the median of the nation (composed of all the districts, aggregated together). Because 
voters do not know the preferences of other voters, the two policy outcomes under the 
different systems (independent vs. confederated) are random variables which differ in 
both their conditional mean and variance. Because preferences are quadratic and the 
uncertainty is Normally distributed, the induced preferences depend only on the mean 
and variance. This leads to a clean analytical solution. 
The basic trade-off for voters is that centralization will result in policy outcomes 
that are, on average, further from their ideal point, while the risk associated with the 
centralized government is lower than the risk associated with independent policy making. 
The latter follows from the fact that the component of risk due to interdistrict variance 
over policy outcomes is reduced with confederation. We call this risk reduction the 
principle of moderation. Though never formalized before, this principle is not new, and 
played a central role in the Federalist's justification for the unification of the American 
states in the late 18th Century. To quote from The Federalist #10: 
The influence of faction leaders may kindle a flame within their particular 
1 See the historical analyses of the formation the U.S. constitution, such as Riker (1992). Those studies 
demonstrate the existence of a clear connection between preferences over policy outcomes and preferences 
for the institutional structure, and present convincing evidence that this link played a prominent role in 
the constitutional conventions. 
3 
States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other 
States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the 
Confederacy ; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must 
secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for 
paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for 
any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole 
body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as 
such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an 
entire State. 
The central finding of our earlier paper was that moderate voters prefer centralization 
and extreme voters oppose it. Specifically, there is a critical voter ideal point such that 
all voters whose ideal point is closer to the expected median prefer centralization and all 
voters whose ideal point is further away from the expected median prefer independence. 
The present paper extends this model in two ways. 
First we consider a much broader range of constitutions that the two extreme cases 
of "all or nothing" national government. These intermediate cases are obtained by rep­
resenting the policy outcome in a district as a weighted average of the local median and 
the median of the confederation. We call this the centralization dimension and show 
below that this captures a wide range of "federal" systems, in which the relative power 
of a district in affecting policies in other districts is allowed to vary. For example, the 
two extreme cases we examined in Cremer and Palfrey (1996) can be identified as special 
cases, one (all power at the local level) in which no district has any influence over the 
policies in other districts, and the opposite case, in which the policies in all districts are 
the same, and are determined by the overall median of the union of all districts. 
Second, we introduce another dimension to the confederation design, which we call 
the representation dimension. We consider two contrasting notions of representational 
formulas, one in which a local unit's representation at the national level is proportional 
to the population of the unit, and one where each district receives the same absolute 
representation. We borrow the terminology of The Federalist #62 and call the first 
proportional representation (with apologies to scholars who study legislative party com­
petition) and the second equal representation. An example of these two extremes would 
be in the U.S. Congress, where, if we think of states as the basic units of the confederation, 
the House of Representatives approximates proportional representation, while the Senate 
has equal representation. Hence, we sometimes refer to these two types of representation 
as "House" and "Senate," respectively. Our representation dimension considers linear 
combinations of these two schemes, which can loosely be thought of as the allocation of 
power between two different chambers in a bicameral national legislature (again using 
the U.S. analogy) . 
As with the Federalists' arguments about a confederation's ability to moderate the 
effects of local factions, they also discussed the trade-off between equal and proportional 
representation. While the latter provides greater retention of local sovereignty for large 
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states, equal representation is a more effective way to moderate factions, especially those 
from large states. Madison discusses the issue of why one ought to have "equal" (Senate) 
in addition than "proportional" (House) representation in the legislative body, and he 
realizes that equal representation of States helps to resolve a trade-off between loss of 
sovereignty and moderation, in a way that all states (large and small) should come 
to realize it as a good solution to the representation problem. Here's an example of 
Madison's discussion, taken from The Federalist #622: 
. . .  in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal 
character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles 
of proportional and equal representation .. . .  In this spirit , it may be remarked, 
that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recogni­
tion of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individuals states, and an 
instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. 
Accordingly, in this paper we examine these various trade-offs in a formal theoretical 
model, by characterizing induced voter preferences over a two-dimensional set of possible 
constitutions, where the two axes are centralization and representation. We obtain the 
following results. 
1. Voter preferences over representation depend on the degree of centralization, and 
vice versa. Voters from large states prefer more proportional representation the 
higher is the level of centralization. Voters from small states prefer less proportional 
representation as the level of centralization increases. 
2. All voters have an induced ideal point which consists entirely of equal representa­
tion, and with a most-preferred level of centralization that depends on the voter 
ideal point in the underlying policy space, but does not depend on the district size. 
Interestingly, this applies equally to voters from large states (relative population 
size greater than 1/n), who sacrifice power to small states under equal representa­
tion. 
3. Consistent with our earlier findings, more extreme voters want less centralization. 
4. A majority rule equilibrium over the two-dimensional confederation issue exists 
within each district. 
5. An equilibrium over all voters in all districts may or may not exist with more 
than two districts. When it does exist, it can involve some degree of proportional 
2We hasten to add that the Federalists were also well aware that small states would be more likely to 
ratify a constitution which provided for absolute as well as proportional representation. This property 
is also captured in our model and is mentioned several times in The Federalist #62. For example: 
"The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of 
compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much 
discussion ... A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is 
not likely to be obtained from the smaller States." 
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representation, but this can happen only in knife-edge cases. Generically, if an 
equilibrium exists, it must involve equal representation. Several examples are given 
to illustrate the range of possibilities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model and notation is introduced 
in Section 2. Induced preferences over the two dimensional space of confederations­
representation and centralization-are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 presents our 
results on existence and properties of majority rule equilibria. Formal proofs are in the 
Appendix. 
2 The Model 
A confederation is composed of n districts. In each district, there is a continuum of 
individuals. The relative size of district i is denoted ai > 0, where I:f=1 ai = 1. The 
underlying policy space is one dimensional and represented by �' the set of real numbers. 
Each individual has an ideal policy, t E �' which we will also call his type. If policy 
x E � is adopted, the utility of an individual of type t is 
U(x; t) = - (x - t)2• 
When voting over constitutions, the agent will be uncertain about the outcome. In this 
case, between two distributions over policies he prefers the distribution with the higher 
expected utility. 
An individual is represented by his type t and the district i to which he belongs. 
Within district i, the types of the individuals are Normally distributed with mean mi 
and variance 1 (this normalization is harmless). The district means are independent 
random variables, normally distributed with mean 0 and variance (}. Each individual 
only knows his own type, the district to which he belongs, and the statistical distribution 
of preferences. 3 
We assume that the political process within any district yields a policy that is the 
ideal point of the median voter of that district. 
2 .1 Confederations 
A confederation is an institutional arrangement in which the policies of different dis­
tricts are, at least in part, influenced by the preferences of voters from other districts 
in the confederation. In practice, this is usually accomplished through a complex array 
of overlapping jurisdictions, representative governments at different levels, and a legal 
3This can be generalized to allow voters to have additional information about their own district. See 
Cremer and Palfrey [1996] for a discussion of possible extensions such as this. 
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system that allocates decisionmaking authority and responsibility across these different 
levels. The end result is ultimately a vector of policies, one for each district. We de­
note such a vector of policies by x = (x1 , ... , xn)· Given the set of institutions and 
the legal system governing the overlapping jurisdictions, we can think of x as emerg­
ing as a function of the underlying preferences in all the different districts. Since we 
take "district" to be the smallest political unit, and since we assume that political com­
petition within a district will be driven by the median voter of that district, we write 
x = C(m1 , . . .  , mn) = [C1 (mi, . . .  , mn), .. . , Cn(m1 , ... , mn)]. That is, the constitution 
of confederation C is modeled as a function which maps vectors of district medians into 
vectors of district policies. This function might be different for different districts, and 
generally will be different in the applications we explore below. To make the analysis 
tractable, we limit consideration to confederations where Ci(m1 , ... , mn) is linear: 
n 
Ci( mi, . . .  , mn; .\) = L Aijmj, j=l 
with Aij 2: 0 and 2=j Aij = 1. That is, we make the simplifying assumption that a 
confederation can be represented by a matrix of influence coefficients, A = [Aij], where 
Aij is the influence of district j on the policy outcome in district i. 
2.2 The Representation/Centralization Axes 
In our earlier paper (Cremer and Palfrey [1996]), we considered only two cases, one in 
which Ci(m1, ... , mn) =mi (independent districts) and a second (complete unification) 
in which policy outcomes correspond to the ideal point of the median voter of the entire 
union: n 
Ci(m1 , . .. , mn) = L ajmj, 'ii i. j=l 
That paper analyzed the induced individual preferences between these two extreme con­
federations, and identified conditions under which a majority of individuals (or a majority 
of districts) would prefer unification to independence. Here, we study the induced pref­
erences of individuals over a much richer set of possible confederations. 
Using the notation of influence coefficients, these two extremes correspond to Aii = 1 
for all i (independence) and Aij = aj for all i, j (unification). In fact, we can think of 
unification somewhat more generally where Aij = Aj for all i, j and Aj is not necessarily 
equal to aj. These correspond to various forms of representation that are possible under 
unification. The case of Aij = aj, treated in our earlier paper, corresponds to Proportional 
Representation. Equal Representation is defined by Aij = 1/n for all i, j. We can 
represent a continuum of multicameral unified systems using a parameter, 'YE [O, 1] , that 
indexes the relative influence of proportional representation. In a unified system this 
would correspond to Aij = "fCXj + (1-'Y)/n. This defines what we call the representation 
dimension, and spans all ranges of mixtures between purely proportional representation 
('Y = 1) and purely equal representation ("!= 0). 
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Of course, nearly all unified confederations of states also have governments at the 
district level, which we call unified systems with federalism to reflect the fact that they 
are a cross between the two extremes of pure independence and full unification. We 
represent a continuum of degrees of centralization using a parameter, f3 E [O, 1], which 
represents the relative weight of the central government in determining policy outcome 
in any given district. This defines what we call the centralization dimension, and spans 
all ranges of mixtures between purely independent systems (/3 = 0) with no central 
government, and fully unified system (/3 = 1), where districts have no autonomy at all. 
Putting these two dimensions together, we have the two main axes-representation 
and centralization-that determine our space of confederations. In the notation of influ­
ence coefficients, the policies in each district will be determined according to: 
Aii = 1 - /3 + /3('Yai + (1 - 'Y)/n), 
Aij = f3('Yaj + (1 - 'Y)/n). 
There are many other possibilities, including other forms of national representation be­
sides the proportional and equal methods, and also variable devolution for different states. 
Thus, one can see that, in spite of our complete abstraction from the institutional details 
of the legal structure and representative organs, this model is able to capture a wide range 
of realistic possibilities. The actual policy outcome in district i, Ci(m1, ... , mn; a, /3, 'Y) 
is given by : 
Ci(m1, ... , mn; a, /3, 'Y) = L mj/3( "(O!j + (1 - 'Y)/n) + mi 
#i 
[1 - f3 + f3('Yai + (1 - 'Y)/n)] 
(1 - fl)m, + (J [ 'Y t, a;m; + (1 - 'Y) t, rn;/n] 
(1 - /3)mi + /3 ["/Mh + (1 - 'Y)Ms] , 
where Mh = 2:.:1 ajmj and Ms= 2:.:1 mj/n can be interpreted as the House median and 
the Senate median, respectively. 
The rest of the paper will look at induced voter preferences and majority rule equilibria 
in this two-dimensional space of confederations. However, it should be noted that there 
are many other possibilities, including other forms of national representation besides the 
proportional and equal methods, and also variable devolution for different states. Thus, 
in spite of the complete abstraction from the institutional details of the legal structure and 
representative organs, this model is able to capture a wide range of realistic possibilities. 
3 Induced Preferences of Voters 
In order to study the understand political conflict along these two basic dimensions of 
the confederation question, in this section we characterize the induced preferences of 
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voters over this ({3, !') space, which is represented by the square, [O, 1] x [O, l]. This 
characterization identifies the shape of voter indifference curves in this space, and shows 
how the ideal points of voters in this space vary as a function of n, i, O", t, and a. 
For an individual with ideal point t in district i, we can compute the interim (i.e., 
conditional on t) expected squared distance between the policy outcome and the ideal 
point for any pair of parameters, f3 and I'· To simplify the formula, we let e = t2 I (1 + (]" ), 
and obtain : 
where 
The analysis is simplified by the substitution of4 µ = {3')', which yields: 
_O"_ [(1 - f3) + [!__ + µa i] 2 l + O"  n 
+ (]"  L: [f!__ + µa j] 2 
#i n 
+ 1 ! O" [ 1 + O" ( 
n 
: 
1 f3 -µEii) J 2 ' 
with the constraints, 0 ::::; f3 ::::; 1 and 0 ::::; µ ::::; {3. 
Level surfaces of WilJ are the indifference curves of type (i, t) over different (/3, µ) 
confederations. If Wis convex, then the first order conditions obtained by differentiating 
W by f3 andµ, characterize the minimum value of Wie, which is the ideal point of voter 
(i, t), provided this minimum satisfies f3 E [O, 1] andµ E [O, 1]. 
3.1 Convexity of W 
In this subsection, we establish that Wis convex, and therefore the first order conditions 
can be used to determine voter ideal points. We further show that, except in unusual 
cases indifference curves are ellipses which are centered at different points of the µ = 
0 axis. That is, all voters ideal points correspond to equal, rather than proportional 
representation, regardless of the size of a voter's state. 
4That is, µ is the total weight on the house and B is a "normalized" type. 
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Theorem 1 Ww is convex, and strictly convex iff Ai - (n - 1) 1=#i a] - a[ > 0. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
3.2 Indifference maps in ({3, µ) space 
For most of the remainder of the paper, we will assume that A > 0 for all districts. The 
case A= 0 is treated in section 5. From the definition of Ai, it is easy to see that Ai will 
in general be strictly greater than 0 for all districts. There is only one exception to this, 
if exactly (n - 1) districts are the same size. Notice that if n = 2, then &1 = &2, so it 
is always the case that Ai = 0. If n > 2, it will generically be the case that Ai > 0. We 
next establish the main properties of the indifference maps when Ai > 0. 
Theorem 2 If Ai > 0 and ai -=/= 0, the indifference curves of the agent of type fJ in the 
district i are ellipses, centered at 
µo(fJ) = 0 
{30(fJ) - 1 - f) l + fJCJ + (1-B)u ' n 
whose maJ·or axes have slope r defined by 
and 
1 n ((1 + CJ)2=j=l a] +  CJ(fJ - l)at) (n-1) lrl - R = - adn + (J + eCJ(n - 1)J + nai 
sgn r = sgn ai. 
The slope of the indifference curves at the points ({3, 0) is 
awie/8{3 n - 1 
8Ww/8µ nai . 
If ai = 0, the ellipses have their main axis parallel to the {3 = 0 axis .  




To summarize, if Ai > 0, the slopes of the main axis of their indifference curves of 
all agents in the district i have the same sign. Furthermore, the slopes of indifference 
curves of any voter is constant along the f3 axis. Moreover, this slope is the same for all 
voters from the district. The slope of the major axis of indifference curves is positive for 
all voters from large districts (ai > l) and negative for all voters with small districts 
1 n (a·>-) i n . 
10 
3.3 Voters' Ideal Confederations 
Since W is strictly convex, we can characterize the ideal points by first order conditions. 5 
Taking partial derivatives of W with respect to f3 and "(, setting each of these partial 
derivatives equal to 0, and then simplifying we get: 
(1-B) - -- -- [n + O" + BO"(n -1)] = 0 
[
/3 µ&i l n n-1 
(1 -e)ai - f3
ai 
[n + (} + BO"(n -1)] + µ [(1 + O") fa; -(1 - B)O"a;] = o n j=l 
Theorem 3 If Ai > 0 and e < 1, then the voter's ideal (feasible) confederation is: 
µ* (e) o 
f3*(e) {3°(e) 
and if Ai > 0 and e > 1, then the voter's ideal (feasible) confederation is 
µ* (B) = {J*(B) = 0. 
Proof : See Appendix. 
(4) 
(5) 
Figure 1 illustrates the feasible set and some representative indifference curves for 
voters from three hypothetical districts. The horizontal axis is the centralization (/3) 
dimension and the vertical axis is the representation (µ) dimension. The shaded area 
marks the set of feasible confederations. Voter 1 is an extreme voter from a large district. 
The figure includes the indifference curve of voter 1 that passes through the origin, to 
illustrate the fact that every extreme voter's ideal confederation is (0, 0). Voters 2 and 3 
are moderate voters from large and small districts, respectively. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
3.4 Discussion and Comparative Statics 
The first part of this theorem says that moderate voters ( e < 1), regardless of the size 
of their district, are unanimously opposed to population-based representation. They 
prefer the national policy to be decided by representative institutions with the same 
number of delegates from each district, and prefer power to be transferred to districts 
via decentralization rather than via population-based representation. For any level of 
centralization, f3, the variance of the centralized component is minimized by setting 
µ = 0. Since the only advantage of centralization is risk reduction, it follows that any 
voter's ideal confederation must have µ = 0. 
5For the moment, we are ignoring the constraints (3 E [O, 1] andµ E [O, (3]. We take account for these 
constraints later. 
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The second half of the theorem is even simpler to understand, in spite of the fact that 
the expression obtained for (3* from the first order conditions is negative, so the feasibility 
constraints bind. In this case, sufficiently extreme voters ( e > 1) want no centralization 
at all, which corresponds to (3 = 0. At (3 = 0, the only feasible value of µ is µ = 0. 
Thus, we have established that the optimal confederation for all voters from all dis­
tricts calls for no proportional representation at the national level. However, we should 
keep in mind that this is not quite the same as saying that all voters unconditionally 
prefer equal representation. 
The comparative statics of how the ideal points change with respect to the exogenous 
parameters of the model are straightforward. For voters with e < 1 it is easy to see that 
(3*( B) is increasing in n. The intuition behind this is simple. The moderation, or risk­
reduction, benefits of centralization are greater as n is greater, independently of district 
size, since having more districts reduces the probability that the centralized policy will 
be dictated by an extremist majority of one wing or the other. For similar reasons, (3*( B) 
is decreasing in (}'. The higher is (}', the more dispersed is the distribution of voter ideal 
points within a district, so there will be a higher probability that the centralized policy 
will be on one extreme or the other. 
3.5 Conditional Ideal Points 
The final question we address is a voter's optimal value ofµ as a function of (3. This will 
be useful later in the paper, where we study the existence of a majority rule equilibrium. 
For voters with ai "I 0, the optimal value ofµ generally will depend on the choice of (3 
since the axes of the indifference curves are not rotated relative to the coordinate axes. 
Therefore, this relationship, µ*((3), will depend on the orientation of the (ellipsoidal) 
indifference curves of the agents in ((3, µ)-space. To see what the solution is, consider 
again the first order condition from differentiation of W with respect to µ, holding (3 
fixed: 
(1 - B)iii; - /)� [n + o-+e<r( n - 1)] + µ [(1+ <r) � iii} -(1 - B)o-iii ] = 0 
Solving for µ, we get: 
Theorem 4 Fix (3. The optimal ideal confederation for a voter e from district i is 
*((3 e) = - (1 - e)ai - (3� [n + (}' + e(J'(n - 1)] µ ' (1+(}')2=7J=1 a] - (1 - e)(J'a; 
if 
< (1 - e)ai -(3� [n + (}' + e(J'(n - 1)] 0 - - (1 ) "'n � 2 ( e) �2 :::; (3. + (}' wj=l aj - 1 - (J'ai 
Otherwise, µ*((3, B) equals either O or (3 depending on whether the right hand side is less 
than 0 or greater than (3, respectively. 
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Proof : See Appendix. 
Whether or not µ*((3, B) is greater than O depends on whether &i is greater than O 
(large districts) or less than 0 (small districts) , and whether f3 is greater than or less than 
f3*(B). 
Consider first the case of large districts (&i > 0). Since &i is greater than 0, the sign 
of µ* (/3) is the opposite of the sign of 
(1 - B) - /3 (1 + BrY + �] 
(1 + CY)2=#i &] + (1 + BrY)6[. 
Since the denominator is positive, the whole expression is negative for all voters such 
that e > 1. Hence µ*((3, B) > 0 for these voters. This establishes that all extremists from 
larger states prefer at least some degree of proportional representation, for every value 
of f3 > 0. 
More generally, in large districts µ*(/3, B) > 0 if and only if f3 > f3*(B). That is, voters 
from large districts are in favor of some degree of a proportional system if and only if 
there is too much centralization relative to their ideally preferred level of centralization. 
The intuition is that by putting some weight on the proportional system, the large district 
can effectively take back some of the sovereignty that was lost because of a high (3. Voters 
from large districts who are sufficiently extreme will want to do this. This can be also 
be interpreted in the following way. Let B*(/3) be the solution of f3*(B) = (3. That is, 
()* (/3) is the voter for whom f3 is the ideally preferred level of centralization. The critical 
value B* (/3) is decreasing in f3, so voters from large districts prefer some degree of a 
proportional system if and only if e < B*(f3). That is, voters from large districts who are 
more extreme than B*(/3) would like some proportional representation. The critical value 
B* (/3) is decreasing in f3. 
Not surprisingly, preferences over /3 in small districts go in exactly the opposite di­
rection from the case of large districts. These voters are in favor of some degree of a 
proportional system if and only if f3 < /3* ( B). The intuition here is exactly the reverse of 
the intuition for why relatively extreme voters from large districts prefer some degree of 
proportional representation. In this case, relatively moderate voters (i.e., voters for whom 
(3* ( B) > (3) will want to cede even more sovereignty. This is done by increasing the weight 
on proportional representation, since doing so reduces the influence of a small district on 
the centralized component of the policy. For any fixed value of f3 there is a critical voter 
B*(/3) such that voters from small districts prefer some degree of a proportional system 
if and only if e > B* (/3). 
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4 Majority Rule Equilibrium 
4.1 Majority Rule Equilibrium Within a District 
A majority rule equilibrium in district i is a centralization-representation pair (/3, µ) 
with the property that there does not exist another pair ((3', µ') such that a majority 
of members in district i prefer ((3', µ') to ((3, µ). One can show that every district has 
a majority rule equilibrium, (f3i, 0), where f3i = f3*(e:ned) and e:ned is the median value 
of e in district i. Moreover, if Ai > 0 then this is the unique majority rule equilibrium 
in that district. This is stated formally and proved below, with an informal proof and 
explanation in Figure 2. 
Theorem 5 If Ai > 0, then within district i! there is a unique majority rule equilibrium 
confederation at ((3* ( e:ned)' 0). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
It is also true that the within-district majority rule equilibria, f3*(e:ned), is independent 
of the relative size of the district, ai, but varies systematically with the underlying 
parameters of the model, n and CY, and to a limited extent, on the profile of sizes of other 
districts, a-i· specifically, f3*(e:ned) is increasing in n, decreasing in CY, is higher the more 
moderate is the district's median voter ideal point. 
4.2 Equilibrium Confederations 
The analysis in the previous section does not address the question of how the induced 
preferences in the various districts are aggregated to reach an inter-district decision about 
the degree of centralization and the extent to which representation is proportional. We 
consider one possibility here. A referendum is conducted in which every individual in ev­
ery district votes, and outcomes are determined by aggregating votes at the confederation 
level6. Thus, an equilibrium confederation is a centralization-representation pair ((3, µ) 
with the property that there does not exist another pair ((3', µ') such that a majority of 
voters in the confederation prefer ((3', µ') to ((3, µ). 
The argument for existence of majority rule equilibria within a district, relied heavily 
on the assumption that the induced ((3, µ )- indifference maps of voters from the same 
district are elliptical and have the same slopes along the (3-axis. In fact, this is true 
for voters whose districts are the same size. Hence the previous analysis holds up if all 
districts are the same size, i.e., ai = aj = l/n, Vi, j. This case is easy to analyze since it 
6There are other possible ways to aggregate votes at the confederation level, including, for example, 
"conventions,'' in which each district sends a delegate, who is assumed to vote at the conventions based 
on the majority preference within his district. 
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is degenerate, in the sense that the centralized policy is neutral with respect to µ, since 
the proportional and equal representation models are the same when districts are of equal 
size. For this special case, majority rule equilibria exist and are given by (/3*(iJ), µ) where 
ff is the median of the medians and µ is any value between 0 and 1. 
The more interesting case, at least for addressing issues of representation, is that case 
where districts differ in size. In this case, the indifference curves for voters can vary in 
important ways across districts. In particular, the major axes of the elliptical indifference 
curves are sloped upward for large districts, and downward for small districts. This leads 
to situations where majority rule equilibria may not exist, in the sense that there may 
not exist (/3, µ) pairs that are undefeated by majority rule. 
The following result fully characterizes majority rule equilibria when they exist. 
Specifically, µ = 0 is a necessary condition for (/3, µ) to be a majority rule equilibrium. 
Moreover, f3 = {J*(ff) is also a necessary condition. That is: 
Theorem 6 If N > 2 and there does not exist i such that aj =ak, Vj ,k #- i, then ('i§, ji,) 
is a majority rule equilibrium only if µ = 0 and 'iJ = /3* (ff) . 
Proof: See appendix. An informal proof is given in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The following example, which is robust, shows that majority rule equilibria may 
not exist. Suppose there are three districts, whose median values of () are given by 
B1ned ;:::: 0, B'fned > 0, and B'!ied > 0. Further suppose that a1 > 1/3 > a2 > a3 and 
/3*(B1ned) < {J(ff) < /3*(B'fned) < /3*(B'!ied), where ff= a1B1ned + a2B'fned + a3B'!ied· This is 
shown on Figure 4. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
We next show that (/3*(ff), 0) is not an equilibrium. Since district 1 is a large district, 
all voters in district 41 with ideal points, e such that e > ff have µ*(/3*(ff), B) > 0. Since 
/3*(B1ned) < {J*(ff) , this consists of a strict majority of members of district 1. Similarly, 
since districts 2 and 3 are small districts, all voters in districts 2 and 3 with ideal points 
e such that 4 e <ff have µ*(/3*(ff), B) > 0. Since /3*(B'fned) > /3*(ff) and /3*(B'fned) > /3*(ff), 
this consists of a strict majority of members of each of these small districts. Thus, for 
sufficiently small values ofµ> 0, a strict majority prefers (/3*(ff), µ) to (/3*(ff), 0). Since 
(/3*(ff), 0) is the only possible majority rule equilibrium, this implies that there is no 
majority rule equilibrium in this case. 
4.3 The Case of Ai = 0 
We treat this special case separately, because the results are somewhat different, and 
because it corresponds to several interesting problems similar to confederation, which 
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commonly arise when there are only two groups (districts). One such situation is civil 
war or separatist movements, which are the reverse of the confederation problem, and 
presumably arise because a large majority of one of the districts in the confederation 
have preferences that are sufficiently distant from the median of the confederation. Fre­
quently these are dyadic in character, pitting one member of the confederation against 
its complement.7 We hasten to add that there are also many examples of unification of 
two districts, including Czechoslovakia, the Belgium-Luxembourg monetary agreement, 
and the common U.S. phenomenon of municipality annexation and consolidation. 
Theorem 7 If Ai = 0, the indifference curves of the agents of district i are pairs of 
parallel lines given by: 
/3 µai = K n (n - 1) 
where K is a constant. Each voter in such a district has a continuum of ideal points, 
consisting of the set of all confederations lying on the indifference line passing through 
the point /3* ( 8), defined in Theorem 1. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
When n = 2, we can show that there is always a unique equilibrium, and it may 
lie anywhere between the /3 axis and the /3 = µ diagonal. In the special case when 
a1 = a2, all confederations with the same /3 produce equivalent policies in every district, 
so uniqueness is defined relative to such equivalence classes of confederations. 
Theorem 8 If n = 2, then there exists a unique majority rule equilibrium. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper investigated questions of sovereignty and representation in confederations. 
We model sovereignty formally by allowing policy outcomes in one district to be affected 
by the distribution of voters in other districts and by the relative sizes of districts. We 
model the representation dimension as a choice of the degree to which each district is 
represented proportionally as opposed to equally. The balance of power between the two 
houses of the U.S. Congress is a classic example of how such trade-offs may be achieved in 
practice. The questions are posed, first at the individual level, and then at the aggregate 
level 
At the individual level the questions reduce to: 
7Examples would include the War Between the States, contemporary separatist movements such as 
Quebec and the Basques, and historical colonial independence struggles such as Algeria and India. 
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(11) To what extent would voters prefer to sacrifice sovereignty of their own district in 
order to ensure more moderate policy outcomes? 
(I2) How will voters from large states differ from voters from small states in their induced 
preferences over proportional vs. equal representation?. 
The answer to (11) generalizes the earlier findings in Cremer and Palfrey (1996). 
Induced preferences over sovereignty cut across traditional left-right political cleavages. 
Instead, sovereignty issues will find extremists from both sides of the political spectrum 
agreeing with each other and in opposition to relatively moderate voters, who prefer more 
centralization. Sufficiently extreme voters will be "separatists," who ideally prefer no 
confederation at all. We also show that preference for more centralization (i.e. , willingness 
to cede sovereignty) increases with n, decreases with <J, and is independent of the size 
distribution of districts. 
The answer to (I2) is more complicated. All voters' ideal confederations would con­
sist entirely of equal representation. However, preferences over representation cannot be 
disentangled from the sovereignty issue. That is, voters induced preferences over pro­
portional vs. equal representation change depending on the degree of centralization. For 
voters from large states, if there is too much centralization, they would like some degree 
of proportional representation, which restores some of their ceded sovereignty. The op­
posite is true for voters from small states. They would like some degree of proportional 
representation only if there is too little centralization. 
At the aggregate level, we the central questions are: 
(Al) What are the properties of majority rule equilibrium in a district? 
(A2) What are the properties of majority rule equilibrium across the whole federation? 
The answer to (Al) is that within each district a majority rule equilibrium exists 
and coincides with the ideal confederation of the median value of B in that district. The 
answer to (A2) is that a majority rule equilibrium may not exist. If there are three 
or more districts, special conditions are required in order for an equilibrium to exist. 
When equilibrium confederations do exist, the equilibrium form of representation must 
be entirely equal representation. The case of two districts is special. With two districts, a 
unique equilibrium confederation always exists and, depending on the relative extremism 
of the larger vs. the smaller state, the equilibrium degree of proportional representation 
can range from entirely equal representation to entirely proportional representation. 
The nonexistence of equilibrium in the general case of more than two districts is 
problematic, and is indicative of the importance of agenda manipulation and procedural 
control at constitutional conventions. Riker (1986) recounts numerous episodes of agenda 
manipulation at the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787, consistent with the sort of 
preference aggregation problem identified in this paper. 
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6 APPENDIX 
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1 
The second order condition for convexity of W requires that the determinant 
is nonnegative. W is strictly convex if and only if Dit < 0. We first establish that Dit 
has the same sign as Ai= (n - 1) L,#i a] - at. Expanding Wu1 gives: 
Taking partial derivatives of W gives 
I n--;1 (n+O"+O"B(n - 1)) -�[n+O"+BO"(n-1)] I _:�[n + O" + B(J(n - 1)] (1 + (]") L,j=1 a]+ O"(B - l)at 
n + O" + ;B(n - 1) I �;,. 1 -ai[n + (J + B(J(n - 1)] I �. (1 + (]") L,1J=1 a]+ (J(B - l)at 








The final step of the proof is to show that Dit ;::::: 0 \:/ i, t. and that Dit = 0 if and only 
if ai = ak \:/ j, k such that j =/:- i and k =/:- i. Fixing &i, we must have L,j=1 ai = -&i. 
Under this constraint I:,7J=1 &J has a unique minimum where all the &/s are equal to each 
other, which implies that they are all equal to &if (n - 1). In this case 
which proves the result. 
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2 
I 
To show that a quadratic function defines an ellipse, it is sufficient to show that the 
function is strictly convex, which is guaranteed by Theorem 1. 
To see that the absolute value of r satisfies equation (1), we apply the standard 
formula for the slope of an ellipse, which is 
1 A -B r- -:;:= -c--
where A is the coefficient on /32, B is the coefficient on µ2, and C is the coefficient on f3 µ 
in the quadratic expression for Wie(/3, µ). Note that r -l/r is increasing on (- oo, 0) and 
(0, + oo), and takes values on both these intervals on (- oo, + oo). Therefore the formula 
only determines r up to its sign. The formula gives 
1 r-­r 
(1 + O") I:,j=1 &J + O"(B - l)&f - �[n + O" + O"B(n - l)O"B] 
-�[n + O" + BO"(n - 1)] 
n ((1 + O") I:,j=1 &J + O"(B - l)&l) n - l - + --&i[n + O" + BO"(n - 1)] n&i 
� (n - 1 _ n ((1 + O")2:,#i aJ + (1 + O"B)al) ) 
ai n n + (]" + 80"( n - 1) 
The sign of r follows direction. To prove (3), observe that 
8Wie/8f3 1 - 8Wie/8µ µ=O = � [-1 + e +  �(n+ O" + O"B(n- l))] 1�cr [ai(l - B) - �ai (n + O" + BO"(n - 1))] 
n- l 1 
--- x -----:::::- . n -ai 
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6.3 Proof of Theorem 3 
Proof: From Lemma 3, these voters have elliptical indifference curves. Multiplying (4) 
by -Oii and adding it to (5), we obtain: 
Since Ai > 0, the term in brackets is not equal to 0, so µ* = 0. Pluggingµ* = 0 into 4, 
yields 
fl*= n(l - e) n + e + (n-l)Bo-' 
If e < 1,  then fl* E [O, 1] so the feasibility constraints (fl E [O, 1] and µ E [O, fl]) do not 
bind, so the solution given by the first order conditions characterizes the minimum value 
of W over the set of feasible confederations. Hence 
µ* = 0 
fl*= n(l - e) n + a- + (n-l)Bo-' 
for these voters. 
If e > 1, then the unconstrained value of fl* is negative, so at least one constraint 
(fl E [O, 1] and µ E [O, fl]) must bind. Since W is convex, the constraint, µ ::; fl must 
bind. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, e > 1 implies µ* = fl*. For this case, the 
constrained optimum can be obtained by replacing µ by fl in W, differentiating and 
solving. To verify that the solution is µ* = fl* = 0, we rewrite the objective function as: 
Setting the derivative of this with respect to fl equal to 0 and simplifying gives: 
Since Ai > 0 and e > 1 ,  this is always negative. Hence the optimal nonnegative value 
of fl is 0. I 
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6.4 Proof of Theorem 4 
Recall the first order condition from differentiation of W with respect to µ, holding /3 
fixed: 
(1 - B)ii, - (J:' [n + O" + ea-( n -1)] + µ [ (1 + o-) t, ii) - (1 - B)llii)] � 0 
Solving for µ, we get: 
_ 
(1 - B)ai 
-
,6� [n + ll + Bll(n - 1)] µ - - (1 + ll) 'Lj=1 Di] - (1 - B)llDi[ 
If this satisfies the feasibility constraints, then this determines µ*. Otherwise, by 
convexity of W, the solution lies on the boundary, as described in the theorem. 
6.5 Proof of Theorem 5 
First notice that if ,6*(8:-nea) ::::; 0, then the result is trivial. Then (0, 0) is the preferred 
point in the feasible set for all since then the median is the ideal point for a majority of 
voters (i.e., those voters with ,6i(B) = 0). 
Thus, suppose ,6*(e:nea) > 0. Consider the two halfplanes defined by the line, L(e:nea), 
following the major axis of the indifference map of voter e:nea and passing through 
(,6*(e:nea), 0). This is illustrated in Figure 2. Consider any point in the halfplane consist­
ing of all points to the left of this line, such as the dot in the figure. Since the major axes 
of the voters are parallel to each other along the ,6 - axis, it follows immediately that 
all voters with B such that ,Bi ( B) > ,6* ( e:nea) prefer ,8* ( e:nea) to y. This is, by definition 
of ,6*(e:nea), exactly half the voters, so that y does not defeat ,6*(8:-nea) by a majority. A 
similar argument applies to any point in right halfplane, such as the point marked with 
a cross in the figure. In this case, all voters with B such that /Ji ( B) < ,6* ( e:nea) prefer 
fJ*(e:nea) to y, soy does not defeat ,6*(e:nea) by a majority. 
To show uniqueness of the majority rule equilibrium, notice that for any point (,8', µ') 
not equal to (,8*( e:nea), 0), continuity implies that all voters with ideal points in a neigh­
borhood of e:nea prefer (,6*(8:-nea), 0) to (,8', µ'). By the argument above, it is also true 
that either all the voters to the left of e:ned or all the voters to the right of e:ned prefer 
(,6*(8:-nea), 0) to (,8', µ'). Thus, a strict majority prefers (,6*(e:nea), 0) to (,8', µ'), hence 
none of these other points can be majority rule equilibria. I 
6.6 Proof of Theorem 6 
If N > 2 and there does not exist i such that Cl!j = ak, Vj,k I- i, then (n-1) L#i Oi]-al > 
0 for all i, so all indifference curves are ellipses. We first show that jJ, = 0. 
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Suppose not, and consider an equilibrium e = (jj, P,) with µ, E (0, ,8], and ,8 > 0. 
Denote by f3!(8, Cii) the optimal /3 for a type 8 voter from district with relative size Cii, µ 
givenµ,. Formally, this is obtained by rearranging the first order condition, equation (4), 
to get: 
/3*(() �) _ 
n(l - 8) n'fiai 
� a· +--µ ' i - n + u + (n - 1)80' n - 1 
Note that this may fall outside the feasible bounds given by the restriction that /3�(8, Cii) E 
[µ,, 1]. Since we have supposed that (,@, µ,) is a majority rule equilibrium, it must be the 
case that f3!( 8' Cii) > fl for 50% of the voters and f3!( 8' Cii) < ,8 for 50% of the voters. If µ µ 
not, one could either increase or decrease /3 slightly, keepingµ fixed at µ, and a majority 
would vote for the new proposal. Now consider all voters for whom /3�(8, Cii) < fl. A 
typical voter like this is shown in Figure 3 where we denote f3!( 8, Cii) by v2• µ 
Now consider rotating the horizontal line, defined by P = {(/3, µ) I µ = 'fl,} clockwise 
by a very small angle of rotation, ¢. This new, downward sloping line, denoted PQ, is 
shown in the figure. For each voter type (8, Cii), define p'},</> (8, Cii) as this voter's most 
preferred feasible confederation, restricted to PQ. The point, P'P</> (e, Cii), for the typical 
voter described above is marked v3 in the figure. Because the preference gradient for 
this voter points directly downward at v2, this implies that v3 lies to the left of e. This 
is also true for any voter for whom f3!( (), Cii) = ,8, as illustrated by the point labelled µ 
v1 in the figure, and by continuity will also be true for a positive measure of voters for 
whom f3!(8, ai) < ,8, such that f3!(8, ai) is sufficiently close to ,8. Thus there must exist a µ µ 
proposal lying to the left of e on P</> which a majority of voters prefer to (,8, µ) . Therefore, 
(fl,µ) cannot be a majority rule equilibrium ifµ > 0. 
Finally, suppose that (,@, 0) is a majority rule equilibrium where ,8 'I- f3*(B). Then 
there exists a majority of voters such that either /3*(8) < ,8 or /3*(8) > ,8. Suppose 
w.l.o.g. there is a majority of voters such that /3*(8) > {3. Then for small enough E, for 
all /3' E (,8 + E, fl), a majority would prefer (/3', 0) to (,8, 0). Thus a necessary condition 
for (,8, µ) to be an equilibrium is that ,8 = f3*(B) andµ,= 0. I 
6.7 Proof of Theorem 7 
The coefficient of µ 2  in (6) is equal to 
-1 (J' [
(1 + O') I: aJ + (1 + u + u(8 - 1) )  alJ + (J' ·--1-· 
If Ai = 0, this is equal to 
J-;-i 
-1 
(J' [(1 + O') I: aJ + (1+0'8) a;J. + (J' #i 
O' �2[
1 + O' J (J' �2 1 + O' ai n _ 1 + 1 + u8 = (n _ l) (l + u) adu + n + 0'8(n - l)J. 
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This enables us to rewrite (6) as follows 
TiVie(,B, µ) = 
which proves the result. 
CJ(n -1) [ 
B( l)J (,8 µai ) 2 --- n+ CJ + CJ n- - - ---1 + CJ n (n - 1) 
2-CJ- (n -1)[1 - BJ (!}_ - µai ) + _CJ +_e 1 + CJ n (n - 1) 1 + CJ 
6.8 Proof of Theorem 8 
I 
If a1 = a2 then all voters have vertical indifference lines. Consider the ideal line of voter 
?J = !B1 + !B2 ,  where 81 and 82 are the medians of district 1 and district 2, respectively. 
Any point (,B* (?J) , µ) such thatµ E [O, ,BJ is an equilibrium. 
Next suppose that a1 > a2 . Let P*(B1) and P*(B2) denote the ideal lines of 81 and 
82 , respectively. It is easily verified that these two lines have slopes that are equal in 
magnitude (greater than 1), with opposite signs; P*(B1 ) is upward sloping and P*(B2 ) is 
downward sloping. 
There are three cases to consider. The intersection of P*(B1) and P*(B2) lies either 
above the diagonal (Case 1), below the horizontal axis (Case 2), or at some point (jj, µ) 
withµ E (0, ,B) (Case 3). 
Case 3 is easiest since for any (,8, µ) -/=- (jj, µ), less than 50% of the voters prefer (,B, µ) 
to (jj, µ). Thus (jj, j],) is a majority rule equilibrium. Obviously no other point can be a 
majority rule equilibrium for this case. 
In case 2, consider the indifference line of the voter with the median preference, e = 
a1B1 + a2B2 . Voters with this ideal point in the underlying policy space will have the 
median ideal confederation, ,B = ,B* (B) , on the horizontal axis (µ = 0), regardless of 
whether they come from the large district or the small district. In Figure 3, we illustrate 
the intersection of the ideal lines of two representative e voters, one from a large district, 
and one from a small district. We also show in that figure the ideal lines of 81 and 82 
voters, the median voters of district 1 and district 2, respectively. Notice, that since 
the intersection of P*(B1) and P*(B2) lies below the horizontal axis (Case 2), a majority 
of district 1 voters have ideal lines to the right of the e ideal line, and a majority of 
district 2 voters have ideal lines to the left of the ?J ideal line. Therefore, (,B*(B) , 0) is a 
majority rule equilibrium. It is easy to verify than there is no other (,B, µ) that can be 
an equilibrium. 
Finally, for case 1, consider the preferences of voters restricted to (,B, µ) on the di­
agonal. The ideal policy on this diagonal for a 81 voter, ,Bp=µ ( 81) ,  is to the left of the 
ideal policy on this diagonal for a 82 voter, ,Bp=µ(B2 ) .  Hence there is a point between 
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{3'J=µ ( 01) and f3'J=µ ( 02) which represents the median ideal point restricted to the diago­
nal, which is denoted M*. Notice, however, that it does not correspond to f3'J=µ (8) , since 
the ideal point on the diagonal for a (J type voter will differ depending on whether that 
voter is from a small or a large district. The indifference line for the district 1 voter that 
passes through M* corresponds to a voter with a lower 0 than the indifference line for 
the district 2 voter that passes through M*. This is illustrated in the figure. Now, by 
an argument similar to Case 2, it is clear than a majority of district 1 voters have ideal 
lines to the left of M* and a majority of district 2 voters have ideal lines to the right of 
Jyf*, but exactly half the voters overall have ideal lines to the right of M*, and half to the 
left. Because the slope of the indifference lines for voters from district 1 is greater than 
1, those indifference lines cut the diagonal from below. Therefore, any move to the right 
of M* is opposed by a majority, as is any move down. Therefore, M* is a majority rule 




Figure 1 :  On this figure, we have represented the indifference curves of three 
agents .  Because the ideal points of the voters depend only on their Os, we see 
that we have B3 < 02 < 01 . Voter 3 is a moderate (his preferred confederation 
has positi
.
ve /3) from a small district (the slopes of his indifference curves for 
µ = 0 is negative) . Voters 2 and 1 are respectively a moderate and an 
extremist from large districts. Voter 1 enables us to illustrate another point. 
She would like a negative f3, but because the slope of her indifference curve 
at confederation (0, 0) is strictly greater than 1, as it must be for all agents 
from large districts, her preferred feasible confederation is (0, 0). 
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Figure 2: The point marked /3* ( B�ed) is the median ideal confederation in 
district i .  It is also the majority voting equilibrium on the whole feasible set . 
To show this, we have represented a typical indifference curve of an agent 
with a small B (the solid curve) and a typical indifference curve of an agent 
with a large B (the dashed curve) . Any move to a constitution such as the 
point marked with a cross will be voted down by all the agents with a large B 
and some of those with a small B. A move to a point such as the one marked 
with a dot will be voted down by all the agents with a small B and some of 





Figure 3: Assume that e Is the putative equilibrium. Therefore, it must also 
be the majority voting equilibrium when choices are restricted to µ = µ. This 
implies, however, that e cannot be a majority voting equilibrium restricted 
to PQ. To see this, consider first an agent whose preferred point on µ = Ji,  
is v2 • By strict concavity and because his ideal confederation is on the 
horizontal axis ,  he prefers a point such as v3 to v2 , and therefore to e. Also 
by concavity of preferences, his ideal confederation on PQ will be to the 
left of e. Now, consider the median on µ = Ji,, whose indifference curve is 
represented on the figure. She prefers v1 to e, and her ideal confederation 
on PQ will be to the left of e. By continuity, this will also be true for some 
voters whose ideal points on µ =  Ji, are "just" to the right of e. Hence, more 
than half of the voters will have an ideal confederation on PQ to the left of 
e, and the contradiction is established. The proof in the appendix formalizes 
the argument, and takes care of potential equilibria on the boundary of the 
feasible set. 
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3 2 1 
.Y 
/3(fh ) {3(8) /3(fh) /3(83) 
Figure 4: This figure illustrates the fact that there can be no equilibrium 
in votes aggregated at the confederation level. There are three districts, 
i = 1 ,  2, 3, with o:3 < o:2 < 1/3 < o:i , whose medians are denoted by ()i · 
Let 0 = I:f=1 o:i()i · If there were a majority rule equilibrium, it would have 
to be the confederation (/3 = /3* (0) ,  µ = 0). This is not possible. We have 
represented the tangents to the indifference curves of the median voters of 
the three districts going through 0. The light arrows indicate the direction of 
the gradient of preferences at the presumed equilibrium. A small movement 
away from that equilibrium, such as that indicated by the thick arrow, would 
increase the welfare of more than half of the voters in each district. 
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